"The-times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty." 1 In mid-June 2010, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether employees using employer-provided communication devices have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text messages.
Reviewed by Jane E. Kirtley* "The-times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty." 1 In mid-June 2010, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether employees using employer-provided communication devices have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text messages.
2 Even assuming that a police officer has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in text messages he sent on a department-supplied pager, this would not necessarily preclude the City from conducting a warrantless search. Here, the Court held that the City of Ontario, California was justified in conducting a warrantless review of the Officer's text message transcripts to determine whether they were workrelated, and therefore, whether the character limits imposed by the City's wireless contract were adequate to serve business purposes. 
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Although Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion found the search to be reasonable based on the facts of the case, he cautioned that "[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear."
3 "Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission," 4 he wrote, suggest that it is too soon for the Court to issue a broad holding that "might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted." 5 Despite concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia chastised his colleagues for their "indefensible" refusal to grapple with the broader question of how the Fourth Amendment should apply to new technology.
6 While recognizing that formulating a test "may sometimes be difficult," Scalia nonetheless contended that "when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice." Predicting that the plurality's fact-specific ruling amounted to a "heavyhanded hint" to future courts, which would, in turn, invite more litigation, Scalia concluded that "[t]he times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty." Nunziato's thesis asserts that the Supreme Court's retreat from earlier telecommunications decisions, which elevated the public's right to receive and impart information above private business or property interests, has resulted in "a negative conception of the First Amendment."
10 Although the First Amendment prohibits government censorship, Nunziato contends that the Court has interpreted it to permit private entities to restrict content in any way they choose. Specifically, she argues that, aided and abetted by the Court's rulings, the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) decision to remove common carriage obligations for cable and other broadband providers undermines their obligation to serve as neutral conduits to facilitate speech. Nunziato recounts a number of chilling examples of alleged content or viewpoint discrimination where broadband providers and wireless carriers allegedly blocked or delayed political messages that they considered controversial, claiming that they did not want to offend their customers.
12 She contends that although "dominant search engine[s] and news aggregator[s]," 13 such as Google, purport to select news stories and Web sites based on computerized search algorithms, they actually restrict communications on a variety of "sensitive issues," including "banish[ing] from existence websites that are critical of [their] practices."
14 Worse still, she alleges that many of these actions were taken without providing customers notice.
Actions of this nature, if taken by government actors, almost certainly would be unconstitutional, unlikely to survive strict or even intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. Nunziato argues that the private sector gets away with it because it is insulated from any obligation to facilitate individual communication, under the mistaken belief that competition in the marketplace will insure free trade in ideas. 15 The public, she contends, cannot be trusted to use its pocketbook to demand the right to express or to access unpopular or minority viewpointswhat Nunziato calls "counter-majoritarian" speech-which is essential to facilitating political debate and discussion. 16 Therefore, she argues, the state has the obligation to intervene to advance these free speech goals. 17 But how can this be done without also violating the constitutional interests of broadband providers and other "speech conduits?" Nunziato argues that this would be possible by returning to the halcyon days of Red Lion 18 (Fairness Doctrine), Turner 19 ("must-carry" provision), and even Marsh v. Alabama 20 (a public forum case from 1946 involving the distribution of religious literature in a company town).
But as Nunziato acknowledges, the courts and the FCC have either repudiated or limited the applicability of these cases, especially in the Internet context, so it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that they believe providers have free speech and property rights of their own to reckon with. Analogizing cyberspace to a traditional public forum, like a public park or street, Nunziato argues that, once the government permitted private entities to regulate and manage electronic communications via the Internet, it effectively privatized the ownership and management of this forum, ceding to the private sector its responsibility to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas. 21 Therefore, she contends, as in any other case when a private entity takes over a govern- ment function, the correct approach is to treat it as a state actor, with no expressive rights of its own to balance against those of the public, and with an affirmative obligation to promote free expression. 22 This would include "Internet speech regulators" like ISPs and e-mail providers, and even the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), but not search engines such as Google, unless the search engine "manipulates" its search results and rankings in ways that might be deceptive. 23 Nunziato recognizes that a "state actor" designation would meet strong resistance, and be a difficult sell to the courts, which have diminished the public forum doctrine in the Internet context. 24 In the alternative, she argues, Congress should pass legislation prohibiting broadband providers from blocking the transmission or use of legal content or applications, from engaging in discriminatory prioritization or degradation, and requiring transparency when they choose to block illegal material. 25 This could be done by redesignating cable and broadband providers not as information services, exempt from Title II of the Communications Act, but as common carriers, repudiating the earlier FCC decision to deregulate which was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2005 with the Brand X case. 26 As Nunziato puts it, "[t]he same principles that justify regulating telephone and telegraph operators and the postal service as common carriers subject to nondiscrimination requirements-in order to 'protect ordinary citizens in their right to communicate'-are valid today with regard to Internet communications." , presumably that holding, finding that the FCC had no explicit legal authority to regulate an ISP's network management practices blocking access to peer-to-peer filesharing sites, and could not rely on ancillary authority to do so, was a disappointing, though perhaps not unexpected, blow.
28 By contrast, Nunziato probably welcomed the FCC's Notice of Inquiry launched on June 17, 2010, seeking public comment on proposals to reestablish the Commission's authority over broadband. focused "ancillary authority" based on, for example, Section 1302 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act; 30 to reclassify broadband as a telecommunications service subject to all the regulations of Title II of the Communications Act; 31 or to adopt a plan proposed by Chairman Julius Genachowski, reclassifying the transmission component of broadband as a telecommunications service, but forbearing to apply Title II's more onerous requirements, such as price caps and tariffs. Under Genachowski's "Third Way," only six "core provisions," including a ban on unreasonable price or service discrimination and a mandate for disability access, would apply.
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The Notice of Inquiry was adopted over the strong objections of two commissioners, Robert McDowell and Meredith Baker. McDowell argued that reclassifying broadband access was both unnecessary and likely to harm the free market, and should be left to the discretion of Congress. 33 Baker agreed that only Congress could provide the necessary "jurisdictional footing" for the Commission to proceed, and, echoing Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Quon, predicted that the adoption of the "Third Way" would "subject the Internet and consumers to years of litigation and uncertainty."
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Interests on both sides of the issue swiftly weighed in. The Open Internet Coalition 35 applauded the proposal as a way to protect consumers from "the most egregious discriminatory behavior by telephone and cable companies." 36 By contrast, telephone and cable companies claimed that the proposals were simply a naked attempt to regulate the Internet. 37 Congress itself remains divided. Although key House and Senate Democrats such as Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, Representative Henry A. Waxman, Senator John Kerry, and Representative Rick Boucher, all of whom chair relevant committees, have expressed support for the Chairman's proposal, many Republicans, and seventy-seven Democrats, oppose it. 38 The ranking members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Representatives Joe Barton and Cliff Stearns, have requested a hearing on the Notice of Inquiry.
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Whether legislation to update the Communications Act will emerge from this is unclear, but many suggest that the industry may be willing to compromise on net neutrality, if doing so would scuttle adoption of the "Third Way." 40 Nonetheless, the time frame for public input to the Notice of Inquiry is short: the deadline for initial comments was July 15; for reply comments, the dead-50 JURIMETRICS line is August 12, which could mean that the Commission might take action even before the November 2010 elections.
These recent developments suggest Nunziato's prayer that "those few companies that serve as the gatekeepers for expression on the Internet should be regulated to ensure that they act as good stewards within the marketplace" might actually be granted. 41 Whether that would be a good thing may depend on your point of view. If you applaud the idea of the FCC, in the words of Commissioner Michael Copps, "reclaim [ing] [its] authority" to protect consumers' free speech rights, and are confident that it will "forbear" from exercising that authority in inappropriate ways, then you will agree with much of what Nunziato has to say in her book. 42 If you think these proposals constitute a "power grab" that would allow the government to "take control" of the Internet, 43 trampling on economic interests and constitutional rights, you will not. But in either case, Virtual Freedom is a provocative book that could not be timelier.
